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The Expansion of Federal Legislative Authority

Terrance Sanda/ow

I.

Introduction

During the 190 years since the Constitution's adoption, the legislative
authority of the Congress has greatly expanded. In the beginning,
Congress's powers were closely circumscribed, but over the years the
boundaries by which they were initially confined have been almost
entirely obliterated. Congress has ceased to be merely the legislative
authority of a federal government; it has for all practical purposes
acquired the legislative authority of a unitary nation. Especially in the
economic sphere, it is only a small exaggeration to say that Congress
· now possesses plenary authority.
Of course, Congress need not-and, in fact, does not--exercise all
the power that it may. A great deal of economic policy is left to the
states. But the reasons are political, not constitutional. If Congress
determines that a national solution is appropriate for one or another
economic issue, its power to fashion one is not likely to be limited by
constitutional divisions of power between it and the state legislatures.
Although federal legislative power has grown in part through
amendments to the original Constitution, 1 much of the growth has
occurred in reliance upon constitutional provisions that have not been
altered since 1789. By and large, the nation has found sufficient
flexibility in the original document to accommodate its change from a
decentralized rural economy to a highly integrated industrial economy
and from a relatively weak nation with a population of approximately
5,000,000 to a world power with a population well over 200,000,000.
Illustratively, the power 'to regulate commerce ... among the several
states', which is conferred in Article I, Section 8, has proved sufficiently elastic to permit Congress to regulate agricultural
production,2 the labelling of drugs, 3 the wages of employees, 4 and a
host of other matters that the framers of the Constitution must surely
have thought they had left to the states.
Since this expansion of federal legislative authority has occurred at
the initiative of Congress, the pan played by the couns is rather
different from that which they have played in curbing state action
inimical to the development and maintenance of a national economy,
the judicial role that is the focus of this book. In performing this latter
function, the couns have been the primary agency of integration. With
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respect to the expansion of federal legislative authority, however, the
courts' role has necessarily been secondary to that of the Congress. But
to say that the courts' role has been secondary is not to say that it has
been unimportant.
Most obviously, if the courts had taken a more restrictive view of
Congressional authority, the nation's history might have been quite
different from what it has been. Given the difficulties of amending the
Constitution, it is not at all evident that a sufficient political consensus
could have been achieved to confer upon Congress, by constitutional
amendment, the full range of powers that it now exercises over the
national economy. Thus, a proposed constitutional amendment to
authorize federal legislation prohibiting child labour, though widely
supported, languished in the state legislatures for two decades without
ever achieving the number of votes necessary for ratification. Congress
acquired authority to enact such legislation only when the Supreme
Court overruled its earlier decision holding such legislation un. constitutional and held that it was a valid exercise of the power to
regulate interstate commerce. 5
Moreover, whatever might have been the fate of proposed constitutional amendments designed to confer upon Congress power to
control particular issues affecting the national economy, the question
remains whether, in the face of restrictive judicial interpretation of
Congress's authority, a sufficient political consensus would have
emerged to permit one or more constitutional amendments conferring
the full range of powers that the Congress now enjoys. Expansion of
Congressional authority through judicial interpretation of existing
constitutional provisions permitted a gradual expansion of that
authority, without the need for a broadly-based political consensus
defining abstractly and in principle which powers should be exercisable at the national level and which should be reserved exclusively to
the states.
The part played by the courts in the expansion of Congressional
authority to regulate economic activity has not consisted only of their
failure to impose enduring obstacles to the expansion. Students of
American constitutional history generally agree that judicial decisions
sustaining novel uses of federal legislative power have contributed to
widespread public acceptance of the legitimacy of the legislation. As
Professor Charles Black has argued, questions concerning the legitimacy of governmental action-not merely the wisdom or unwisdom
of the action, but the right of the government to have acted at all-are
inevitable when governments are limited by a constitution. 6 The
disintegrative potential of such questions is especially great when they
involve the distribution of authority in a divided or federal system. The
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contest in such situations is not the uneven one between government
and an individual but rather-at least in theory and often in realitybetween competing governments, each of which commands substantial resources. The danger to the central authority is not merely the
occasional dramatic conflict over the legitimacy of one or another of
its enactments, but the corrosive effect of continual challenges to its
authority that cannot be resolved authoritatively.
Judicial review has served as one-and in the opinion of some
observers, the most important-of the mechanisms for mediating such
conflicts. In doing so, it has conferred legitimacy upon the extension of
federal power, and thereby increased its acceptance. Just how important the courts' role has been in this regard is, none the less, open to
dispute. Questions concerning the extent of federal legislative powers
were not frequently before the courts in the nation's formative years.
When they did begin to arise with greater frequency, the dominance
of the nation over the states had been established by the Civil War.
Economic realities have further strengthened Congress's position.
Nevertheless, it seems hardly doubtful that the courts have played at
least a useful part in gaining acceptance for the expansion of Congressional power. The courts' relative insulation from immediate
political controversy has given to their decisions the authority of
disinterested and independent judgment. Perhaps of greater importance, the custom of justifying decisions in written opinions has
required the courts to articulate rationales for Congressional action.
Novel legislation is thus shown not to be an unprincipled response to
one or another interest group whose political power is temporarily
ascendant or to the problems of the moment, but an exercise of the
authority conferred by the organic document that binds the nation.
Those who oppose a certain enactment may continue to believe it is
unwise, but they are denied the more potent argument that it represents a usurpation of power.
The courts' role in articulating rationales for Congressional action
has also been important because of the tendency of the Congress to
shape legislation to the mould of judicial doctrine. The relations
between Congressional and judicial actions are, in other words,
reciprocal. Judicial decisions are not merely a response to Congressional action, determining whether or not legislation is valid: they
also influence the content of subsequent legislation. Time and again,
the reach of federal statutes and the manner in which Congress has
sought to deal with a national problem have been determined by an
effort to ensure that enactments are within the scope of federal power,
as defined by the courts.
An examination of the courts' role in the economic integration of
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the United States thus requires attention to the part they have played in
the expansion of federal authority over the economy. Although courts
have not been primarily responsible for that expansion, they have had
an influence upon it. Judicial decisions have directly affected the pace
and, at times, the shape of the expansion. They have, moreover,
importantly influenced the terms of the continuing debate over the
proper place of the federal government in the regulation of the national
economy.
A consideration·of the full range of Congressional powers, even of
those most directly concerned with the economy, would unduly
lengthen this study. It would, moreover, require attention to much
detail of parochial interest only. Accordingly, I shall attempt only to
describe the underlying theory concerning the source of federal legislative powers and to give an account of the historical development of the
two powers, the commerce power and the spending power, that have
been primarily employed by the Congress to expand its control over
the national economy.
II.

The Theory of Enumerated Powers (Herein of Implied Powers)

In legal theory, the legislative powers of the federal government are
enumerated, i.e. Congress may exercise only those powers that are
conferred upon it by the Constitution. The theoretical significance of
this limitation can best be appreciated by contrasting federal legislative
power with the legislative power of the states. State legislatures, it is
customarily said, may exercise any power that is not denied them by
their own constitutions or by the federal constitution. Congress, on the
other hand, may exercise only the authority conferred upon it by the
federal constitution. Of course, even when it legislates in the exercise
of such authority, it must act in a manner consistent with any limitations that are imposed by the federal constitution. Determining the
validity of an act of Congress thus involves a two-step inquiry. The
initial question is whether the enactment can be justified as an exercise
of the authority specified in the Constitution. If that question is
answered affirmatively there remains the question whether the enactment transgresses one or another of the numerous limitations that the
Constitution imposes on federal legislative authority. 7
The understanding that the federal government might exercise only
enumerated powers was implicit in the original Constitution. It was
made explicit, just two years after the Constitution became effective,
by the adoption of the Tenth Amendment, which provides:'The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
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and to the people.' The Tenth Amendment notwithstanding, the
theory of enumerated powers has ceased to be an effective limitation
upon the authority of Congress. Although Congress, the courts, and
commentators continue to give lip-service to the theory, the limits
that the framers thought it placed upon the expansion of federal
legislative power are now almost completely eroded. The constitutional specifications of Congressional power no longer serve to mark
the outer boundaries of its authority, but are the starting-points for an
analysis that invariably leads to the conclusion that Congress has the
authority to deal with whatever problems it deems to require a national
legislative solution.
Although the growth of federal legislative authority has been
judicially justified largely through expansive interpretation of the
constitutional enumerations of Congressional power, it may be useful
to note at the outset another technique by which the growth might
have been justified. The object of the Constitution, it might have been
argued, was to establish a nation and, therefore, a government with
legislative authority co-extensive with the needs of the nation. On this
view, the constitutional specifications of power would be taken as
illustrative only, not as defining the reach of Congressional authority.
Congress would be authorized to legislate whenever the objects of the
Constitution, as set forth in the Preamble, would be advanced thereby.
Nearly all students of American constitutional law would reject
such an interpretation of the Constitution, but there is, none the less,
some historical basis for it. The Constitutional Convention initially
adopted a proposal by Virginia that the national legislature be empowered 'to legislate in all cases to which the several States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation'. 8 This proposal
was sent to the Committee on Detail which was responsible for drafting specific constitutional provisions embodying the proposals
referred to it by the full Convention. The Committee reported back a
draft constitution containing an enumeration of Congressional
powers similar to that now contained in Article I, Section 8. 'The
history and records of the Convention', as several students of constitutional law have recently observed, 'yield little evidence as to
whether [the enumeration of powers was] accepted because the
delegates thought that the national government should be strictly
limited to a specific set of powers or because they assumed this listing
included the sweeping powers which had been implied by the [Virginia]
proposal.' 9
Against this background, it would surely have been possible to
maintain that the enumeration of powers in the Constitution was
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not exhaustive and that Congress might exercise other powers in
furtherance of national objectives. To put the point somewhat differently, Congress would, on this interpretation, have been permitted
to exercise powers that were not enumerated whenever the object to be
accomplished was beyond the competence of a single state. As indicated above, this reading of the Constitution has not generally been
accepted, perhaps because the Tenth Amendment has seemed to stand
in the way. Thus, in Kansas v. Colorado, 10 the Court rejected the claim
that the reclamation of arid lands was among the inherent powers of
the national government:
[C]ounsel for the government relies upon 'the doctrine of sovereign and
inherent power,' .... His argument runs substantially along this line: All
legislative power must be vested in either the state or the national government; no legislative powers belong to a state government other than those
which affect solely the internal affairs of that state; consequently all powers
which are national in their scope must be found vested in the Congress of the
United States. But the proposition that there are legislative powers ... not
expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that
this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such a government
clearly appears from the Constitution, independently of the Amendments .
. . . This natural construction of the original body of the Constitution is made
absolutely certain by the 10th Amendment. 11

The unwillingness to infer Congressional power from a generalized
conception of national responsibility for issues beyond the competence
of individual states is subject to one important exception. 'Foreign
affairs are national affairs. ' 12 The full reach of federal power
over foreign affairs cannot be captured within the powers enumerated
by the Constitution. Indeed, in the Curtiss- Wright case, Justice
Sutherland on behalf of the Court opined that '[t]he broad statement
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution ... is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs' .13 The negative implication, that
the federal government has powers over foreign affairs that are not
dependent upon constitutional specification, is amply borne out by the
cases. In the Chinese Exclusion case, for example, the Court held that
Congress could legislate to exclude aliens because: 'Jurisdiction over
its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent
nation. It is a part of its independence... ; [T]he United States, in their
relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one
nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations,
the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its
absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.' 14
This justification of Congress's power is inconsistent with the theory
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of enumerated powers, but as suggested by Professor Louis Henkin,
the nation's leading authority on the Constitution and foreign affairs,
it alone will suffice to explain the full reach of Congress's power over
the nation's external relations. 'The attempt to build all the foreign
affairs power of federal government with the few bricks provided by
the Constitution has not been accepted as successful. It requires considerable stretching of language, much reading between the lines, and
bold extrapolation from "the Constitution as a whole", and that still
does not plausibly add up to all the power which the federal government in fact exercises.' 15 Whatever the doctrinal difficulties in justifying plenary federal power over the nation's foreign affairs, there is no
doubt that it exists. It seems to have been assumed from the very
beginning of the nation's history that in relation to other nations the
United States is one country.
In the domestic sphere, however, debate about the appropriate
allocation of authority between the federal government and the states
has been a continual feature of American politics since 1789. From the
very beginning, almost until the present day, that debate has been cast
in terms of constitutional interpretation. Different clauses of the Constitution have been prominent at different times in the nation's history,
but recurrently the question has been discussed in terms of the proper
meaning to be given one or another of the constitutional enumerations
of Congressional power.
In the original Constitution, the most important of Congress's
legislative powers were enumerated in Article I, Section 8. Among the
powers conferred by that section were the powers:
(1) To levy and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

and provide for the Common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin money, regulate the Value thereof, and of Foreign Coin, and fix
the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To establish Post Offices and Post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors an exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the
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Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
In the several decades immediately following adoption of the Constitution, debate about the distribution of authority between the
nation and the states centred upon the first and last of these clauses.
The questions were: for what purposes might Congress levy taxes, and
what powers not explicitly stated might Congress exercise in making
'laws which shall be necessary and proper' in executing those powers
that were expressly set forth? The former question was not decided by
the Supreme Court until well into the twentieth century. 16 The latter,
however, was the subject of Chief Justice Marshall's celebrated
opinion for the Court in the relatively early case of McCulloch v.
Maryland. 17
McCulloch arose out of the controversy surrounding the Second
Bank of the United States. Differences about the meaning to be given
the 'necessary and proper' clause had, however, begun much earlier.
Congress had enacted legislation creating a Bank of the United States
as early as 1791. In doing so, it acted upon the advice of Alexander
Hamilton, who maintained that a federally chartered bank would
facilitate the payment of taxes, enhance the government's borrowing
capacity, and increase capital available for investment. Although the
Constitution did not explicitly confer upon Congress the power to
establish a bank or to create corporations-indeed, a proposal to
confer such power had been specifically rejected by the Constitutional
Convention-Hamilton found ample authority for the legislation in
the 'necessary and proper' clause. His reliance upon that clause was
opposed by Thomas Jefferson, who saw in Hamilton's argument the
seeds of a limitless extension of federal authority. Jefferson vividly
stated his concern in opposing a bill that would have granted a federal
charter to a mining company: 'Congress are authorized to defend the
nation. Ships are necessary for defence; copper is necessary for ships;
mines, necessary for copper; a company necessary to work the mines;
and who can doubt this reasoning who have ever played at "This is the
House that Jack Built"? Under such a process of filiation of necessities
the sweeping clause makes plain work.' The clause did not, in
Jefferson's view, support legislation that would merely facilitate, or
make more convenient, the exercise of Congressional power over
subjects enumerated in the Constitution; it authorized only such
legislation as might be necessary for that purpose. 18
The charter of the First Bank of the United States lapsed before the
disagreement was judicially resolved. In 1816, however, Congress
established the Second Bank of the United States. Although the Second
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Bank initially had considerable public support, it soon fell into disfavour, and a number of state legislatures enacted measures hostile to
it. Among these was the Maryland statute at issue in McCulloch,
which levied a tax on certain banking operations conducted without
authority from the state. McCulloch, the manager of a branch of the
Bank of the United States located in Maryland, refused to pay the tax,
and the state thereupon commenced an action against him to recover
statutory penalties. The state courts gave judgment for the state, and
McCulloch brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, seized the opportunity
to give a very broad reading to the constitutional grant of law-making
authority. The initial question, as he analysed the case, was whether
Congress had authority to incorporate a bank. Unlike Hamilton, who
claimed such authority for Congress under the 'necessary and proper'
clause, Marshall justified Congress's action in creating the Bank
largely without reference to the clause. Acknowledging that Congress
could exercise only enumerated powers and that the power to incorporate a bank was not specifically enumerated,~ he none the less
concluded that the power could fairly be impl,ied from those that were
enumerated. It was significant, he maintained, that the Constitution,
unlike the Articles of Confederation, did not prohibit the exercise of
powers not 'expressly' delegated. Even the Tenth Amendment, 'which
was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which
had been excited', had omitted the word 'expressly', presumably to
avoid the 'embarrassment' that it had created under the Articles of
Confederation. In consequence, he continued, the question whether a
particular power had been delegated could be answered only 'on a fair
construction of the whole instrument'. '[We] must never forget', he
concluded, 'that it is a constitution we are expounding.'
... A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be
carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which composed those objects be deduced from the nature of the
objects themselves. 19
Approaching the Constitution in this spirit, Marshall had no
difficulty demonstrating that it conferred upon Congress the power to
incorporate a bank. Although the instrument did not explicitly confer
the power, it did confer the 'great powers' to lay and collect taxes,
borrow money, regulate commerce, declare and conduct war, and
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raise and support armies and navies. '[A] government, intrusted with
such ample powers ... must also be intrusted with ample means for
their execution.' The choice of an appropriate means, Marshall
intimated, was a legislative, not a judicial, decision. 'The government
which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of
performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be
allowed to select the means .... ' To be sure, Marshall conceded, the
power to create corporations 'appertains to sovereignty', but '[i]n
America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the states. They are each sovereign
with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with
respect to the objects committed to the other.' Thus, even though the
power to create corporations 'appertains to sovereignty', there is no
reason why it should not be exercised by the United States if it serves
the objects that are entrusted to the federal government. 20
Only after thus establishing Congress's power did Marshall turn to
the 'necessary and proper' clause. The Constitution, he wrote, 'has not
left the right to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the
power conferred on the government, to general reasoning'. It has
explicitly conferred authority to enact 'all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers
.. .'. Marshall rejected Maryland's argument that the use of the word
'necessary' confined the Congress to enacting laws that were
indispensable to exercising the other powers conferred. The word does
not, he argued, have so limited a meaning, as demonstrated by a
comparison of the clause with Article I, Section 10, which prohibits the
states from levying taxes upon imports or exports, 'except what may
be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws .. .'. The
word 'necessary', like others, 'is used in various senses; and in its
construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using
them, are all to be taken into view'.
Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially
depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to
insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This
could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as
not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be
appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in
a constitution intenped to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means
by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would
have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the
properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide,
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by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all must have been
seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have
declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without which
the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to
accommodate its legislation to circumstances. If we apply this principle of
construction to any of the powers of the government, we shall find it so
pernicious in its operation that we shall be compelled to discard it. 21

Jefferson's test of 'strict necessity' was thus rejected. Congressional
authority to exercise powers not explicitly enumerated was to be
determined by ascertaining whether they were 'appropriate' to attaining the objects that the Constitution had confided to the federal
government. As Marshall put it, in one of the opinion's most frequently quoted sentences: 'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
[sic] with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. ' 22
Marshall's famous dictum that 'it is a constitution we are expounding' was judged by Justice Frankfurter to be 'the single most important
utterance in the literature of constitutional law-most important
because most comprehensive and comprehending'. 23 The judgment
applies as well to the entire opinion in which the sentence appears.
McCulloch is, as James Bradley Thayer once wrote, Marshall's
'greatest work', 24 not only because of the skilfulness and power of its
argument, but because of the vision that underlies the opinion.
Marshall understood that with the passing of time the nation could not
be confined within the specific intentions of the framers. Legislative
power must have the capacity for growth as the needs of the nation
might require and political circumstances might permit. The achievement of McCulloch was to demonstrate that such growth was possible
within the theory of enumerated powers. Although McCulloch did not
end the debate between 'strict' and 'loose' constructionists, it laid a
foundation that would support the expansion of federal powers to the
extent required by the felt needs of subsequent generations.
The persuasiveness of Marshall's opinion rests, in part, upon the
skill with which he converted 'powers' into 'objects'. With two exceptions, Article I, Section 8, does not mention objects. It merely confers
powers. In Marshall's hands, powers became objects, values that the
people had created the federal government to promote. By converting
powers into objects Marshall increased the plausibility of his claim
that Congress might exercise powers not expressed in the Constitution. 'Powers' are means. If the Constitution specifies some means that
may be employed by Congress, it is difficult to argue that others may
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also be employed, save perhaps such as are strictly necessary to effectuate those that are expressed. If the Constitutional enumerations are
viewed as 'objects', however, it is a good deal more plausible to argue,
as Marshall did, that Congress may choose any means reasonably
calculated to achieve them.
Marshall's argument for a broad reading of Congressional authority
was buttressed by several 'institutional' considerations. The most
important of these is only partially explicit in the opinion. Marshall
placed considerable reliance upon the unforeseeability of the future as
a justification for broadly interpreting Congress's powers. The Constitution, he wrote, was 'intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs'. 25
Marshall must have been aware, however, that a need for powers not
anticipated by the framers could have been satisfied by amending the
Constitution. The question, in other words, was not whether the
future was to be bound by narrowly-conceived prescriptions from the
past, but whether decisions about the wisdom of Congress's exercising
unanticipated powers should be made by it or through the amending
process.Marshall never directly addressed that question.
Those who have followed him have tended to answer it by observing
that the procedure for amending the Constitution is very cumbersome.
Were an amendment necessary whenever Congress might require
authority not specifically intended by the framers, it might be unable to
act with appropriate expedition. Moreover, amendment requires a
consensus among the states. A decision by the states is not, however,
the equivalent of a decision by the Congress. Although the members of
Congress are elected from the states, and in that sense may be said to
represent the same constituencies as state legislators, the two are
subject to quite different institutional pressures. Congress's concern
with national issues, its interaction with the executive branch, and the
need of its members to take account of one another's interests tend to
ameliorate the pressures towards parochialism that exist in the state
legislatures.
Neither the broader outlook of the Congress nor the greater ease of
enacting legislation is, standing alone, a reason for preferring legislation to constitutional amendment as a means of deciding whether
federal power should be expanded to accommodate changing conditions. Both can be, and in the course of American history have been,
urged as reasons for precisely the opposite conclusion. Their persuasiveness as reasons for the former conclusion depends upon the
premiss that the United States is a nation: that the common interests of
its citizens are more important than their diverging interests. If that
premiss is accepted, but only if it is, the conclusion is nearly irresistible
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that Marshall rightly rejected the amending process as the primary
mechanism for determining whether Congress should be permitted to
exercise powers not explicitly conferred by the framers.
The rejection of the amending process left only Congress or the
courts to decide which powers not explicitly conferred upon Congress
might be exercised by it. Although not eschewing any role for the
courts, Marshall again rested upon an argument of institutional
competence as a reason for vesting the responsibility mainly in the
Congress. '[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to
effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake
here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretension to such a power'. 26
A final 'institutional' reason for interpreting Congressional
authority broadly is suggested in a later part of Marshall's opinion
which is not directly concerned with that issue. After concluding that
Congress had the authority to create the Bank, Marshall went on to
hold that Maryland's tax upon the Bank was invalid. A state could not
levy a tax upon an instrumentality of the United States. Maryland had
argued that acceptance of the arguments Marshall advanced in support of that principle would also prohibit the federal government from
taxing banks chartered by the states. Marshall responded that 'the two
cases are not on the same reason. . . . [W]hen a state taxes the
operations of the government of the United States, it acts upon ... the
measures of a government created by others as well as themselves, for
the benefit of others in common with themselves'. On the other hand,
'The people of all the states, and the states themselves, are represented
in Congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When
they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their
constituents .... ' 27 Especially in recent years, Marshall's argument has
come to be widely regarded as a justification for judicial deference to
federal legislation that is alleged to encroach upon the reserved powers
of the states. As Professor Herbert Wechsler has put it, 'the Court is on
weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution
to that of the Congress in the interest of the states, whose
representatives control the legislative process and by hypothesis have
broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged act of Congress'. 28
Despite its age, McCulloch captures better than any other opinion of
the Court both the broad outlines of contemporary constitutional law
regarding Congressional power and the techniques of contemporary
constitutional analysis. Like contemporary constitutional law, it
purports to recognize judicially enforceable limits upon Congress's
exercise of its powers. But while the powers are stated clearly and
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confidently, the limits are stated obscurely, more nearly as a necessary
concession than as an important concern. 29 Marshall's eschewal of
formalism has an equally contemporaneous ring, and is perhaps of
greater importance. His conversion of 'powers' into 'objects' is the
source of the modern Court's practice of viewing the Constitution as
embodying 'values', not rules. His reliance upon consideration of
institutional competence, similarly, presages important elements of
contemporary constitutional analysis. Both are employed by the
present-day Court, as they were employed by Marshall, to read the
Constitution with greater concern for the meaning that can be put into
it than for the meaning that can be drawn from it.

III.
A.

The Commerce Power
DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE 'NEW DEAL'

Among the discontentments that led to calling the 1787 Convention,
none was more important than that resulting from the commercial
rivalries that had developed among the states under the Articles of
Confederation. The consequence of those rivalries, as reported by
Albert Beveridge, Marshall's biographer, was the enactment by the
states of 'tariff laws against one another as well as against foreign
nations, and indeed as far as commerce was concerned, each State
treated the other as foreign nations. There were retaliations, discriminations, and every manner of trade restrictions which local ingenuity and selfishness could devise'. 30 The elimination of these rivalries, or at least of the restrictive practices that they had generated, was
one of the primary tasks of the Convention.
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Constitution speaks so
briefly to the subject. Apart from the prohibition of state taxes on
imports and exports in Article I, Section 10, the only provision of the
Constitution directed at the problem was Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
which conferred upon Congress power 'to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes'. The absence of any other provisions dealing with a problem so
central to the purpose of the Convention strongly suggests that the
framers thought that Article I, Section 8 was adequate to carry the
burden of solving it. Nevertheless, if it was not apparent at the time,
subsequent experience soon demonstrated that the spare language of
the commerce clause left many questions unanswered.
The Supreme Court first had occasion to address these questions in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 31 decided in 1824, five years after the decision in
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McCulloch v. Maryland. Gibbons involved the validity of a New York
statute that conferred a monopoly to navigate the waters of the state by
steamboat. The challenge to the statute rested, in part, upon the
ground that it excluded from New York's waters a vessel that had been
licensed under an act of Congress. Chief Justice Marshall, who again
wrote for the Court, took the opportunity to interpret federal power
expansively.
He began by rejecting the claim that 'commerce' encompassed only
the purchase and sale of goods. The regulation of navigation, he
asserted, was one of the people's primary 'objects' in creating the
federal government and that government had done so from the time of
its commencement. To limit the meaning of the word 'commerce' in
the manner suggested 'would restrict a general term, applicable to
many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more,-it is intercourse. It describes the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations in all its
branches .... ' 32
Marshall might well have ended his discussion of the scope of
federal power at this point, since once it was established that commerce included navigation, it was beyond dispute that the federal
licensee, who was navigating between New Jersey and New York, was
engaged in commerce 'among the several states .. .'. The opinion
continues at length, however, to consider the meaning of the phrases
'with foreign nations' and 'among the several states'. The former,
Marshall wrote, comprehends 'every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations'. The latter
extends to 'that commerce which concerns more states than one',
excluding from Congressional control only 'commerce which is
completely internal [to a state] ... and which does not extend to or
affect other states'. 33
Significantly, Marshall did not confine Congressional power to
commerce that crossed state boundaries, but extended it to all commerce that 'concerns' or 'affects' more than a single state. The breadth
of his language in describing the reach of Congress's power plainly was
not inadvertent. The distribution of authority over commerce between
the nation and the states, he wrote, conforms to the general design of
the Constitution.
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those
internal concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those which are
completely within a particular state, which do not affect other states, and
with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of
the general powers of the government. 34
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Although Gibbons v. Ogden technically respected the theory of
enumerated powers, it demonstrated-as had McCulloch-that the
theory was compatible with a very broad view of Congressional
authority. The enumerated powers, themselves susceptible to very
expansive interpretation, did not state the outer limits of Congressional power, for Congress could invade the 'reserved' power of
the states when necessary 'for the purpose of executing some of the
general powers of the government'. Gibbons followed McCulloch also
in defining the reach of Congressional power in a way that largely
excluded the judiciary from enforcing the limits. Its test for determining whether Congress could justifiably act was a practical one,
✓ whether more states than one were affected. Such a test, Marshall
emphasized in Gibbons, as he had in McCulloch, was largely beyond
judicial competence. Congress's power in relation to the objects
entrusted to it is, he wrote, 'plenary'. 'The wisdom and the discretion
of Congress, their indentity with the people, and the influence which
their Constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other
instances ... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure
them from its abuse'. 35
More than a century later, Justice Robert Jackson wrote that
Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden 'described the federal
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded'. 36 Yet, in the
circumstances of Marshall's time, the test that he established undoubtedly left a great deal of economic activity beyond the reach of the
federal government. The full potential of that test for permitting the
federal government to displace state power did not become apparent
until the industrial revolution had taken hold in the United States and
Congress had begun enacting legislation to deal with its consequences.
When it did become apparent, beginning in the last decade of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court attempted to define limits to
Congressional power.
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 37 for example, the Court,
abandoning the pragmatic approach that Marshall had adopted to
measure Congress's power, held that an acquisition of four sugar
refineries which brought 98 per cent of the nation's refinery capacity
under common control did not violate the Sherman Act's prohibition
of combinations in restraint of trade. Although the Court's decision
technically involved only a construction of the statute, the construction was premised upon a narrow conception of Congress's
power under the commerce clause. Commerce, the Court maintained,
did not include manufacturing, agriculture, mining, or other production activities. Although these activities might affect commerce,
they did so only 'incidentally and indirectly'. A restraint upon com-
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merce would be only an 'indirect result' of the combination, and
'however inevitable and whatever its extent ... such [a] result would
not necessarily determine the object of the ... combination .... '
The Court thus departed from Marshall's pragmatic test for deter"I,
mining Congress's authority under the commerce clause and substituted one that looked to the 'nature' of the activity to be regulated.
During the next half-century, the same approach was intermittently
employed by the Court to invalidate a number of Congressional
initiatives, including not only statutes that would have regulated
production but also those that regulated labour relationships. 38
Knight and the cases that followed it have often been criticized for a
supposed failure to appreciate the realities of modern economic life.
But Chief Justice Fuller, who wrote for the Court in Knight, was fully
aware of those realities; indeed, they were the major justification for
his departure from Gibbons. As Fuller wrote, 'Slight reflection will
show that if the national power extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive
industries, whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for
state control'. _.Ih~ cli_sagre_~111e11t between Fuller and his critics,_in other
words, involved political and constitutional theory, noLpositive
__ economics. Whether in response to their own political predilections or
to their understanding of the framers' intentions, Fuller and the justices
who followed him sought to maintain areas of economic life over
which the states would exercise exclusive authority. At an earlier time,
Congress's power to regulate all economic activity affecting interstate
and foreign commerce could coexist with the retention of such
authority by the states.lBut in the circumstance of a modern industrial v
economy, both Fuller Jnd his critics agreed, one or the other would be
forced to yield. Either the states would lose the exclusive control over
areas of economic life that they traditionally had exercised or Congress
would lose the capacity to regulate all economic activity that concerned 'more states than one'. f
The Court's effort to confirk federal power lasted for more than
four decades, but the justices never succeeded in developing principles
that were adequate to the task. As pressures for the extension of the
federal authority mounted, refinements and inconsistencies developed
in the Court's decisions. Within the field of transportation, for
example, the Court permitted Congress to regulate wholly intra-state
activity because of the_effect_of_the activity on interstate commerce.
Thus, in the Shreveport Rate case, 39 the Court sustained Congress's
authority to act against intra-state railroad rates that were discriminatorily low in relation to interstate rates that had received federal
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approval. Precisely why the effect of an intra-state actlVlty upon
interstate commerce justified federal control of the former in this
instance, but not in cases involving production activities, was never
explained.
In the main, the Court's decisions during this period are of historical
interest only. Decisions that limited federal power have been overruled; those that sustained federal power have largely been superseded
by others that give Congress far greater latitude. 40 The major contemporary interest of the decisions is in the lesson that they offer
regarding the difficulty of imposing principled limits upon the power
of Congress over economic activity. The. inability of the Co.urt.1Q
J~h.ion..s.ueh principles does oot, of course, dcmonstrate·the-imf>Ossi"-·
hlfuY. of the task(Ifii!,~ _<:l.oes strongly_s.uggest that couJ:ts cannQt.easily
escape t_h~.p.ressureuha.uhigh lev~lof ecaoomkintegratiQri g~nerates
lorT·in governmental ower from 'l.oca_t ..to 'c:entrar
~ s . If for no ot er reason than that they are members of the
community, judges are bound to recognize-in some spheres, if not in
all-that exclusively local control of activities that have communitywide consequences is unsatisfactory. As judges yield to these perceptions, their ability to maintain principled limits upon the power of
__ the central authority inevitably diminishes.
J,,
There is one important exception to the proposition that the Court's
~ decisions during the period from 1895 to 1936 are only of historical
importance. In a line of decisions beginning with the Lottery case, 41
the Court held that the plenary power of Congress over interstate
commerce permitted it to exclude goods and activities from that
commerce. The consequence was vastly to expand the range of Congress's authority, enabling it not only to exclude from interstate commerce products and activities that it considered objectionable but also,
as an incident of that power, effectively to regulate 'local' activities
that otherwise would have been beyond its control.
The Lottery case involved the validity of an 1895 enactment that
prohibited the interstate transportation of lottery tickets. In upholg_ing
the st
e Cou
·
he contention that the ower to re uate commerce did not include the power to prohibit it. Congress's
power over interstate commerce, the Court wrote, is 'plenary
... and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the
Constitution'. Within the sphere of its competence, the power of
Congress is as great as that of the states in theirs, and just '[a]s a State
may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of its own people, forbid
all sales of lottery tickets within its limits, so Congress, for the purpose
of guarding the people of the United States against the "widespread
pestilence of lotteries" and to protect the commerce which concerns all
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the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to
another'. The Lottery case expanded federal legislative authority
beyond even the broad limits outlined by Marshall. In McCulloch,
Marshall held that the validity of a statute was to be determined by
ascertaining whether it was reasonably calculated to advance the
'objects' with which the federal government had been entrusted.
'Should Congress', he wrote, 'under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to
the government, it would be the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say
that such an act was not the law of the land'. 42 In the Lottery case,
however, the Court refused to confine Congress to the pursuit of
specified objectives, holding that as long as the power it exercised was
among those specified in the Constitution, the objects it might pursue
were unlimited. 43
Congress quickly took advantage of its newly recognized power,
employing the regulatory technique sanctioned in the Lottery case to
control conduct that would otherwise have been beyond its reach. One
year after the decision, it enacted legislation prohibiting the interstate
shipment of adulterated food. In Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, 44
the Court upheld the power of the federal government, acting under
the legislation, to seize adulterated food that was no longer in interstate commerce. Two years later, in Hokev. United States, 45 the Court
sustained federal legislation prohibiting the transportation of women
in interstate commerce for immoral purposes. And in the same year, in
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 46 the Court upheld a federal statute that
imposed retail labelling requirements on goods that had moved in
interstate commerce.
The authority of Congress to prohibit interstate commerce, and
incidentally to condition the movement of persons and goods in such
commerce, 47 permitted a significant expansion of federal power.
Decisions such as the Lottery case and Hoke v. United States enabled
Congress to employ the commerce power to achieve non-economic
objectives. The commerce clause became, in tiffect, a •,rehicle by ,Mhicll
Con ress ni1ht act in furtherance of moral objectives that traditiona ha
o e states.
The legitimacy of using the commerce clause for such ends is a subject
of continuing controversy, 48 but the validity of doing so is firmly
established.
Its plenary power over interstate commerce also permitted Congress
to achieve practical control over economic activities that were not
independently subject to its regulation. As the economic life of the
nation became increasingly integrated, restrictions imposed by the
Congress upon goods moving in interstate commerce became increas-
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ingly difficult to avoid. Congress might, under the doctrine of the
Knight case, lack authority to regulate production directly, but its
power to exclude goods that failed to meet specified standards from
interstate commerce subjected a substantial amount of production to
its practical control. Few producers, in the twentieth century, could
forgo the interstate market. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 49 the Court for
the first time imposed limits upon Congress's power to regulate
production through its control of the movement of goods in interstate
commerce, invalidating a statute that prohibited the interstate movement of goods produced by child labour. The Court's efforts to
distinguish other legislation that it had upheld were patently unsuccessful, and commentators have tended to view the decision as
resting on nothing more than the Court's distaste for labour legislation. Although the decision stood for some years as an obstacle to the
enactment of federal child labour laws, and perhaps to other federal
labour legislation, it lacked generative capacity. The federal government, through its plenary power over interstate commerce, continued
to exercise control over many 'local' activities.
B. THE MODERN ERA: ABANDONMENT OF JUDICIAL
LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMERCE POWER

The Court's efforts to confine federal legislative authority continued
into the 1930s and eventually produced a constitutional crisis. After
the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President in 1932, Congress responded to the national demand for a solution to the problems
created by the Great Depression by enacting a series of measures which
subjected the economy to an unprecedented amount of federal·regulation. By 1937, when Roosevelt commenced his second term in office,
the Supreme Court had held nearly all these measures unconstitutional. Several of the decisions rested on grounds that seemed effectively to deprive Congress of power to deal with the nation's economic
problems.
Of these, three involved the scope of Congressional authority under
the commerce clause. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 50 the Court invalidated a statute that established a
compulsory retirement and pension plan for all carriers subject to the
Interstate Commerce Act. The Court acknowledged Congress's power .J
to regulate interstate transportation, but held that the statute was
'really and essentially related solely to the social welfare of the worker'
and, therefore, that it was 'not in purpose or effect a regulation of
commerce within the meaning of the Constitution'. In a companion
case, ~ e r Poultry Corp. v. United States, 51 the Court invalidated
the National Industrial Recovery Act, which, inter alia, regulated the
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wages and hours of the employees of covered employers. Employee
wages and hours, the Court held, had only an 'indirect' effect upon 'commerce and were, therefore, beyond the authority oTCongress. A
similar result was reached the following year in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 52 which invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935. '[T]he effect of the labor provision of the Act ... primarily falls
upon production and not upon commerce; ... production is a purely
local activity.'
The Court's intransigence in maintaining that production and
labour relations were beyond the authority of Congress not only
deprived the federal government of power to deal with important
elements of the nation's economic crisis, it flew in the face of a
widespread belief that only Congress could deal effectively with the
nation's economic problems. The states were widely regarded as
impotent to deal with the problems precisely because they were
national in scope. Any attempt by a state to regulate wages and hours
or to control production would, unless all (or at least many) acted in
concert, merely put it at a competitive disadvantage. In an integrated
national economy, moreover, price and wage levels or labour unrest in
any part of the nation produced ripple effects throughout the economy.
The Court's insistence that production and labour relations wer~
'local' activities thus seemed to rest upon its failure to understan~ J
modern economic conditions.
The practical consequences of the Court's decisions might alone
have brought it into public disfavour, but dissatisfaction with the
Court was heightened by the sense that it was the Court, not the
Constitution, that had created the barriers to effective federal action.
As legal scholars and government lawyers pointed out, the doctrines
that the Court employed to limit Congress were not required by the
language of the Constitution; indeed, doctrines dating back to
Gibbons v. Ogden might have been employed to sustain Congressional authority. Moreover, since these latter doctrines continued to be
applied in other contexts, where the Court was more accepting of
Congressional authority, there seemed ample ground for the suspicion
that it was the Court's distaste for Congress's economic policies, not a
coherent doctrine of federal-state relations, that accounted for its
decisions. 53
In 1937, shortly after his second election, Roosevelt moved against
the Court, urging the Congress to enact legislation that would permit
the appointment of an additional member of the Court for each
member who had served for ten years and had passed the age of 70.
Although initially Roosevelt disingenuously justified the proposal as a
means of enabling the Court to handle its work-load, it was generally
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understood that his true purpose was to allow the appointment of
justices whose constitutional views conformed to those of the President and Congress. The 'Court-packing' plan was the first serious
challenge since Reconstruction to the Court's independence in performing its constitutional function, and as such it was the subject of
wide and often bitter public debate. Ultimately, the Congress refused
to adopt it. Before the plan was defeated, however, the Court retreated. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 54 it sustained the National Labor Relations Act, which conferred the right of collective bargaining upon employers engaged in
occupations 'affecting [interstate] commerce'. Alton, Schechter, and
Carter were not explicitly overruled. They were, however, largely
ignored, and it would not have required a very astute observer to
appreciate that they lacked continuing vitality.
The decision in Jones & Laughlin marks the abandonment of the
Court's efforts to impose limits on Congress's power under the commerce clause. In every subsequent case in which it has been questioned,
Congressional authority has been sustained. 55 The range of economic
activities that the Court has held to be within the commerce power is
now so broad that a contemporary constitutional lawyer would have
difficulty identifying any that are not beyond its reach. Congress's
plenary power over interstate commerce has become, in effect, a
plenary power over the national economy.
-£.. The foundations of this new constitutional order are Gibbons v.
~ Ogden and the Lottery case. Of these, the former has been the more
significant in extending federal authority over economic activities. As
the Court recognized as early as the Knight case, unqualified
acceptance of Marshall's test for measuring Congressional powerwhether the activity regulated 'concerns more states than one'-leaves
little if any economic activity beyond the authority of Congress. By
returning to Marshall's empirical approach, and abandoning the conceptual limits that Knight, Hammer v. Dagenhart, and the Depression
era cases imposed upon it, the Court has freed Congress to adopt
whatever economic measures it considers necessary in the interest of
the national economy.
The breadth of Congressional power to regulate activities affecting
interstate commerce has diminished the importance of its power to
exclude goods and activities from interstate commerce. In recent years,
the latter has been important primarily in enabling Congress to legislate for non-economic objectives. At times, however, Congress has
employed its power to prohibit interstate commerce in pursuit of
economic objectives, generally when it wishes to refrain from exercising all its constitutional authority. But in a few instances, the technique
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of prohibiting certain types of interstate commerce has been used in
combination with Congress's power to regulate activities affecting
commerce in order to achieve a result that conceivably could not have
been reached by the latter alone.

1. The Scope of the Power to Regulate Activities Affecting Interstate
Commerce
The precise question in Jones & Laughlin was whether Congress could
regulate labour relations at a manufacturing plant owned by a fully
integrated steel company. The case was an ideal one for demonstrating
the artificiality of the concepts that the Court had formulated to limit
Congressional power over the economy. At the time of the decision,
Jones & Laughlin was the nation's fourth largest steel producer. It
owned and operated not only plants for producing steel but ore, coal,
and limestone properties; extensive land and water transportation
facilities; fabricating plants; warehouses; and sales offices throughout
the United States and in Canada. Approximately 75 per cent of its
product was shipped out of Pennsylvania, where its steel-producing
plants were located.
In sustaining Congress's power to regulate labour relations at these
plants, the Court employed language whose breadth approached that
of Gibbons v. Ogden:
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the
power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advancement'; to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its safety'; 'to
foster, protect, control and restrain.' ... That power is plenary and may be
exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what the source of the
danger which threatens it'. . . . Although activities may be intrastate in
character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. 56
The question whether the company's labour relations affected
interstate commerce, the Court continued, could not be considered 'in
an intellectual vacuum'. In view of 'its far-flung activities', industrial
strife at its plant 'would have a most serious effect on interstate
commerce'. 'When industries organize themselves on a national scale,
making their relations to interstate commerce the dominant factor in
their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor
relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not
enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the
paralyzing consequences of industrial war?' 57
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Although the opinion emphasized Jones & Laughlin's size and
integrated character, another decision the same day and several others
handed down within the year revealed that these factors were not
controlling. In each, the Court upheld the application of the National
Labor Relations Act to a small company, engaged only in production,
solely upon a showing that it processed raw materials from, or shipped
its product to, another state. 58 Several years later, in Wickard v.
Filburn, 59 the Court went even further, sustaining the power of
Congress to regulate agricultural production that was not intended for
interstate commerce, indeed, not intended for commerce at all. The
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 imposed quotas on the production of wheat that were applicable whether the wheat was intended
for sale or for consumption on the farm. Appellee, who had exceeded
the quota, sought to avoid the penalty that had been imposed upon
him, contending that Congress lacked authority to restrict production
intended for domestic consumption. The Court held that appellee's
purpose in producing the wheat was immaterial:
That an activity is of local character may help in a doubtful case to determine
whether Congress intended to reach it.... But even if appellee's activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what
might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'. 60
Nor was the Court troubled by the fact that appellee's production
was minuscule in relation to the interstate wheat market. Congress's
power, it held, was determined by the aggregate effect of activities
like those of appellee. 'That appellee's own contribution to the
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution,
taken together \\'ith that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial. ' 61
In the years since Wickard v. Filburn, Congress has frequently relied
upon the 'aggregate effect' principle and the Court has continued to
employ it in sustaining legislation. In Perez v. United States, 62 for
instance, the Court was faced with a challenge to a federal statute that
imposed criminal penalties upon 'extortionate credit transactions'transactions involving, for example, the threat of violence to collect
debts. Petitioner, who had been convicted under the statute, asserted
that it exceeded Congress's authority under the commerce clause.
Although the Act was not limited to transactions affecting interstate
·commerce and no proof was offered that petitioner's conduct was in
any way connected with interstate commerce, the Court sustained
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Congress's authority, relying upon evidence before the Congress that
extortionate credit transactions were a significant source of revenue
for 'organized crime' and were used by it to finance its interstate
activities. The failure to establish any connection between petitioner
and interstate commerce was held to be irrelevant: 'Where the class of
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal
power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual
instances of the class.'
Perez demonstrates not only the breadth of Congressional authority
under the prevailing interpretation of the commerce clause, 63 but the
consensus that supports that interpretation. Only one member of the
Court, Justice Stewart, dissented. 64 Eight members of the Court thus
voted to sustain Congressional power in a case in which there was not
the slightest evidence that interstate commerce had been affected, even
in the smallest degr~e.

2.

Congressional Control Over Goods and Activities in Interstate
Commerce
During the same period in which the Court has expanded Congress's
power to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce, it has
removed whatever limits Hammer v. Dagenhart imposed upon
Congressional power to regulate the movement of goods and persons
in interstate commerce. In the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
Congress prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
produced by employees whose wages and hours failed to meet federal
standards. It also prohibited 'production of goods for [interstate]
commerce' except in compliance with those standards. Both provisions were unanimously sustained in United States v. Darby. 65 In
upholding the former provision, the Court relied upon the line of
decisions commencing with the Lottery case and expressly overruled
Hammer v. Dagenhart. Congress is, the Court said, free to follow its
own conception of public policy in determining whether goods should
be excluded from interstate commerce. Congress had determined that
interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which
competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which
the commerce flows. The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate
commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which
the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no
control. 66
The Act's direct regulation of goods produced for interstate commerct; was sustained on the different theory that Congress had power
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to control production as a means of effectuating its decision to exclude
the offending goods from interstate commerce. Since Congress had
excluded from interstate commerce all goods not produced in accordance with the labour standards it had established, the Court held, it
might adopt any 'means reasonably adapted' to enforcing the exclusion. Just as Congress might regulate intra-state railroad rates as a
means of effectuating its regulation of interstate rates, 67 so might
Congress regulate production for interstate commerce in aid of its
policy of excluding from that commerce goods that had not been
produced in accordance with federal labour standards.
The Court's argument in this respect has been criticized as 'bootstrapping' that it permits Congress-by the simple expedient of excluding goods from interstate commerce and then prohibiting the
production of the goods-to regulate intra-state activities even though
no effect upon interstate commerce has been demonstrated. 68 In view
of the broad range of activities that have been held to affect interstate
commerce, however, it is difficult to imagine what activities are
brought within Congress's power by Darby that would not otherwise
be subject to its authority. Indeed, the Court in Darby offered the
'affecting commerce' rationale as an alternative theory for sustaining
the statute's provisions regarding 'production for commerce'. Among
the evils aimed at by the Act, it said, was the 'dislocation' of interstate
commerce 'caused by the impairment or destruction of local business
by competition ... '. The means adopted by Congress to protect interstate commerce, suppressing the production of goods produced under
substandard labour conditions, 'is so related to that commerce and so
affects it as to be within the reach of the commerce power'.
In Darby, Congress employed its power to exclude goods from
interstate commerce to regulate production. Other cases demonstrate
that the power may also be employed as a means of regulating activities after interstate shipment has ended. In United States v. Sullivan, 69
for example, the Court sustained application of the labelling provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to a retail
sale. Defendant, a retail druggist in Georgia, had purchased a properlylabelled 1,000-tablet bottle of sulfathiazole from a. Georgia wholesaler, who in turn had obtained it from a supplier in another state some
months earlier. Several months after his purchase, defendant made
two retail sales of twelve tablets each, transferring the tablets to bottles
that were not properly labelled under the federal act. The Court
summarily rejected defendant's contention that the transactions were
beyond the reach of Congress under the commerce clause. Neither the
fact that the tablets were no longer in the original container nor the fact
that defendant had acquired them from a local supplier deprived
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Congress of power over the transaction.
In reaching this result, the Court placed primary reliance upon
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 70 which had held that Congress might
directly control retail labelling as a means of enforcing its policy of
excluding mislabelled products from interstate commerce. Significantly, however, the Court also cited Wickard v. Filburn, thereby
indicating that Congress's authority over defendant's sales might also
be derived from its power to regulate activities affecting commerce.
Sullivan thus reinforces the suggestion made earlier, that Congress's
power to regulate activities 'affecting commerce' now confers so comprehensive a power over economic activities that it need no longer rely
upon its power to reach 'local' activities indirectly through its power to
exclude goods from interstate commerce. Further support for that
suggestion may be found in Maryland v. Wirtz, 71 which sustained an
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act substantially broadening its coverage. As originally enacted and upheld in Darby, the Act
regulated only the w;iges and hours of employees 'engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce'. The amendment
sustained in Wirtz extended the coverage of the Act to all employees of
'an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce'. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, thought it obvious
that Congress had a basis for concluding that the wages and hours of
all employees of such employers, not just those who were themselves
engaged in commerce or in production for commerce, 'affected interstate commerce'.

3. The Commerce Power and Non-Economic Objectives
Since the decision in the Lottery case, Congress has often relied upon
its power over commerce to pursue non-economic objectives. Most
frequently, such legislation rests upon Congress's power to exclude
goods and activities from interstate commerce. 72 With the expansion
of federal power to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce, it
is clear that Congress can, if it wishes to do so, significantly expand the
coverage of most of such legislation. The statute sustained in Perez
offers a striking illustration of the possibilities.
Another and more important illustration is provided by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Title II of that Act prohibited racial discrimination, with minimal exceptions, in any 'inn, hotel, motel or
other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests'. In
Heart of Atlanta Mo'tel v. United States, 73 a unanimous Supreme
Court sustained Congress's power to enact the prohibition under the
commerce clause. Congress had, the Court said, ample evidence that
racial discrimination in transient lodging impeded interstate travel
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by blacks. Even if the operation of a hotel or motel were to be
characterized as a local activity, therefore, Congress might regulate it
because of its effect upon interstate travel. Nor was it material that
Congress was legislating against moral wrongs. Once the burden upon
commerce was established, 'Congress was not restricted by the fact
that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it
was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.'
On the same day, in Katzenbach v. McClung,7 4 the Court also
sustained, again unanimously, a provision of the Act that prohibited
racial discrimination in any 'restaurant ... principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises' if 'it serves or offers to
serve interstate travellers or a substantial portion of the food it serves
... has moved in [interstate] commerce'. Congress had, the Court said,
ample evidence to justify a conclusion that racial discrimination in
restaurants impeded interstate travel by blacks and, by reducing their
opportunities to purchase goods, reduced the flow of merchandise in
interstate commerce. 'In addition, there were many references to
discriminatory situations causing wide unrest and having a depressant
effect on general business conditions in the respective communities.'
The Court's rationale was, plainly, broad enough to sustain legislation
broader than that enacted by the Congress. If Congress was authorized
to prohibit racial discrimination because of its depressing economic
effects and because of its tendency to reduce purchases from out-ofstate suppliers, then any restaurant might have been made subject to
the Act.

4. Continuing Effects of the Federalist Tradition
Judicial decisions since 1937 established that Congress, in the exercise
of its authority over foreign and interstate commerce, has plenary
power over the national economy. Although some opinions contain
language suggesting that there are limits to the commerce power, the
results that the Court has reached and the theories it has advanced in
support of those results cannot easily be reconciled with that conclusion. Nevertheless, the notion that there are limits to the commerce
power persists and at times appears to exert an influence upon both
Congress and the Court.
In a number of cases, the Court has construed ambiguous federal
regulations so as to exclude from their coverage conduct that has
traditionally been within the domain of the states. 75 Congress, the
Court has said, 'will not be deemed to have significantly changed the
federal-state balance' unless it 'conveys its purpose clearly'. More
strikingly, the Court has employed the same principle in refusing to
apply a statute according to its literal terms. A 1951 statute prohibited
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the shipment of gambling devices in interstate commerce and imposed
incidental reporting obligations on 'every manuacturer and dealer in
gambling devices'. The government maintained that the statute should
be applied literally. Relying on decisions such as Darby and Sullivan, it
argued that Congress might constitutionally require reporting of
wholly intra-state transactions 'to make effective the prohibition of
transportation in interstate commerce'. Defendant maintained that
such a reading of the statute would extend it beyond Congress's
power. In United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 76 the Court
declined to reach the constitutional issue, intimating that it was not
without difficulty. It held, instead, that the statute should not be
construed to govern wholly intra-state transactions:
We do not question that literal language of this Act is capable of the broad,
unlimited construction urged by the Government. Indeed, if it were enacted
for a unitary system of government, no other construction would be appropriate. But we must assume that the implications and limitations of our
federal system constitute a major premise of all congressional legislation,
though not repeatedly recited therein. Against the background of our tradition and system of government, we cannot say that the lower courts, which
have held as a matter of statutory construction that this Act does not reach
purely intrastate matters, have not made a permissible interpretation. We
find in the text no unmistakable intention of Congress to raise the constitutional questions implicit in the Government's effort to apply the Act in its
most extreme impact upon affairs considered normally reserved to the
states. 77

The Court's occasional intimations that there are limits to the
commerce power are reinforced by the effort it makes when legislation
is sustained to demonstrate that the conduct regulated has some
connection with interstate commerce. Since there would be no need for
such a demonstration if Congress had plenary authority over the
national economy, as it would in a unitary system, there is an implication that Congress's powers are not unlimited. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to imagine any regulation of economic activity that would be
held by the Court to be beyond Congress's power under the commerce
clause if Congress stated its purpose clearly and firmly.
Accordingly, the persistence of the notion that Congress's powers
are not unlimited is important primarily for the effect that it has upon
Congress. An examination of its debates suggests that Congress takes
seriously the notion th~t there are limits to its power. Although it
seems never in recent years to have drawn back from enacting legislation because of doubts about its authority under the commerce
clause, it has on occasion debated whether particular legislation would
exceed its power and has, as in the legislation at issue in Perez, at times

78

Ch.II Sanda/ow III B 4

been careful to develop evidence concerning the relationship between
interstate commerce and the activities it seeks to regulate.
Were these the only manifestations of Congress's concern for the
limits of its power, one might conclude that it is merely playing out
a ritual from which all significance has been drained. Congress does,
however, often restrict the coverage of legislation to situations in
which there is a demonstrable nexus between the activity regulated
and interstate commerce. It may be, therefore, that the ritual serves to
remind Congress of the nation's federal tradition and thereby tempers
its tendency to view any significant problem as an appropriate subject
of national legislation. But if, as some students of constitutional law
believe, the ritual does have such an effect, its influence is limited
to legislation that is not primarily concerned with economic objectives.
In the areas of economic regulation, Congress has during the past
several decades behaved as though it were the legislature of a unitary
nation. Virtually any problem that is thought to be an appropriate
concern of government is also considered an appropriate subject of
federal legislation.
IV.

The Spending Power78

The federal government currently spends in excess of $500 billion (i.e.
$500,000 millions) annually, of which more than 75 per cent is spent
for domestic purposes. Its expenditures support the full range of
activities that have been undertaken by governments in modern industrial society. The major part of the federal government's domestic
budget is allocated to programmes operated directly by it. For
example, it operates a system of Old Age and Survivors Insurance; 79 it
maintains a system of national parks; 80 it has assumed responsibility
for important areas oflaw enforcement; 81 and it administers a number
of programmes concerned with the provision of medical care. 82
A significant part of the federal budget is devoted to support of
programmes administered by state and local governments. In recent
years, these subventions have amounted to approximately 20 per cent
of all state and local expenditures and more than 50 per cent of the
expenditures of some municipalities. A portion of the funds that state
and local governments receive from the federal government are
'general purpose' grants with very few conditions attached to their
expenditure. Most federal subventions, however, are 'categorical
grants', i.e. they may be used only for the purposes specified. Grants
of this type often require compliance with very detailed conditions.
Several hundred such grant-in-aid programmes are currently in effect,
influencing almost every area of state and local activity.
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Although both the absolute amount and the relative importance of
federal expenditures for domestic purposes have increased significantly during the twentieth century, especially during the past forty
years, the spending power has been an important instrument of
national policy from the beginning of the nation's history. And from
the beginning, almost until the present time, questions have been
raised about whether the purposes of a proposed expenditure were
properly of federal concern. Not infrequently, the question has been
cast in constitutional terms. But despite the general truth of de
Tocqueville's observation that '[s]carcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question', 83 the Courts have had almost no influence upon Congress's
use of the spending power to effect national policies. A brief review of
the debate surrounding the spending power may, therefore, serve as a
useful antidote to the tendency to suppose that constitutional development in the United States is solely in the hands of the courts.
The central question in constitutional terms arises from the
traditional arid still prevalent theory that the United States is a government of enumerated powers. Controversy has centred upon the proper
interpretation of the first clause of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution: 'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all
duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.' More specifically, debate has focused upon the breadth of
federal power to 'provide for the ... general welfare of the United
States'.
A possible reading, but one that has never gained broad acceptance,
would treat the phrase as authorizing Congress to exercise the full
array of legislative power in pursuit of what it determined to be the
general welfare. Although the possibility of such an interpretation was
urged by opponents of the Constitution when it was before the country
for ratification, it was promptly repudiated by those who favoured
adoption. 84 Purely· as a matter of textual analysis, the inclusion of the
phrase between two phrases concerned only with the power of taxation suggests that so broad an interpretation is unwarranted. Of more
importance, the subsequent enumeration of powers in Article I,
Section 8-embodying the general understanding that Congress was
not to possess plenary legislative power-would be pointless if the
'general welfare' clause were to be read as conferring virtually complete legislative power upon Congress. 85 In consequence, it has been
generally accepted that the 'general welfare' clause is to be read as a
qualification of Congressional taxing power, i.e. that Congress may
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lay taxes (and by almost unavoidable implication expend the proceeds) to provide for the general welfare. 86
The question remains, what is the 'general welfare'? Although
numerous variations have been suggested, basically two theories have
competed for acceptance. By the broader view, commonly associated
with its initial proponent, Alexander Hamilton: 'The only qualification of the generality of the phrase in question which seems to be
admissible, is this: That the object to which an appropriation of money
is to be made be general, and not local; its operation extending in fact
or by possibility throughout the Union, and not being confined to a
particular spot.' 87 A second and more confining interpretation,
traditionally associated with Madison, would limit Congressional
power under the 'general welfare' clause to spending in aid of the
powers enumerated in the remainder of Article I, Section 8, and
elsewhere in the Constitution. Under current, expansive interpretations of these powers, the practical difference between the two
theories may be insignificant, but the constitutional basis for federal
subventions was debated and determined at a time when these powers
were interpreted less generously than they are now. During much of
the nineteenth century, accordingly, the 'general welfare' clause was,
as the 'commerce' clause was to become at a later date, the focal point
of debate over the appropriate role of the federal government in the life
of the nation. Proponents of the Hamiltonian position relied mainly
upon the literal meaning of the language of the clause and, increasingly
as time went on, upon the established practice of Congress. Adherents
of the narrower view, as might be anticipated, relied chiefly upon the
dangers of a concentration of power in the federal government. 88
Although controversy over the interpretation to be given the
'general welfare' clause continued throughout the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth, the necessity for a definitive resolution was
avoided for a time by reliance upon Congressional 'power to dispose of
... the territory or other property belonging to the United States'
under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, as the authority for land grants to
the states. Since such grants were the characteristic form of federal
subventions during the nineteenth century, 89 and since the federal
government was directly engaged in few, if any, activities that were not
clearly of federal concern, questions concerning the scope of the
'general welfare' clause might be avoided to the extent that Article IV,
Section 3, provided the necessary authority. Although significant dissents were occasionally expressed, notably by Presidents Jackson,
Pierce, and Buchanan in messages accompanying vetoes of land grants
for education and welfare, it appears to have become generally
accepted, not later than the adoption of the Morrill Act in 1862, that
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federal land or proceeds from the sale of such land might be granted to
the states for the 'common benefit'. 90
Acceptance of Congressional authority under Article IV, Section 3,
despite continuing controversy over the meaning of the 'general welfare' clause seems anomalous in at least two respects. A portion of the
land granted to the states was acquired, prior to the adoption of the
Constitution, by cession from several of the states. With respect to
such land, it seems fair, as Burdick argues, to interpret Article IV,
Section 3, 'in furtherance of the trust expressly assumed when the
territory was ceded, namely to dispose of it for the common benefit'. 91
Much of the land granted by Congress to the states, however, was
acquired by purchase with funds obtained from taxation. The reason
why Congress should have had greater power to dispose of those lands
than to dispose of the funds with which they were purchased seems
never to have been carefully considered. 92 Additionally, since Article
IV, Section 3, authorizes disposition of 'territory or other property',
presumably including money, it is far from clear why that clause
should be deemed adequate to authorize land grants but not cash
subventions.
In any event, replacement of land grants by monetary grants as the
principal form of federal financial assistance to the states was
accompanied by renewed interest in the extent of Congressional
power under the 'general welfare' clause. Yet, as a practical matter, it
seems fair to conclude that Congress and the President, so far as it was
within their power to do so, had during the nineteenth century determined the question in favour of the Hamiltonian position. Funds were
regularly appropriated in pursuit of objects which, under interpretations of the Constitution then current, were clearly beyond
federal regulatory power. The Department of Agriculture, for
example, was established in 1862 and the year following funds were
appropriated for its use for the study, among other matters, of plant
and animal diseases, insect pests, and the adulteration of food. Even
prior to that time, Congress had appropriated funds for the collection
of agricultural statistics, the distribution of seeds and other purposes
related to agriculture. Monetary grants in support of programmes to
be conducted at land-grant colleges established under the Morrill Act
were commenced in 1887 with annual appropriations for 'agricultural
experiment stations', and in 1900 annual appropriations were
authorized for the general support of those institutions. In these and
numerous other enactments, the political branches of the government
evidenced acceptance of the broad interpretation of the 'general
welfare' clause. The Supreme Court, however, had yet to be heard
from.
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The issue was squarely presented to the Court in 1923 in actions by
the state of Massachusetts and a federal taxpayer, challenging the
validity of a 1921 statute authorizing grants to states for maternal and
child health programmes. Both suits were dismissed by the Supreme
Court without consideration of the constitutional issue: the taxpayer's
suit for lack of standing and the state's for failure to present a justiciable controversy. 93 The state's suit, the Court concluded, amounted to
no more than a 'naked contention that Congress has usurped the
reserved powers of the several States by the mere enactment of the
statute, though nothing has been done and nothing is to be done
without their consent; and it is plain that that question, as it is thus
presented, is political and not judicial in character'. 94 Neither the
asserted motive of Congress 'to induce the states to yield a portion of
their reserved rights' nor the allegation that 'the burden of the appropriation falls unequally upon the several States' was adequate to create
a justiciable controversy. The burden of taxation falls not upon the
states but upon their inhabitants, 95 the Court said, and the allegedly
unlawful Congressional 'purpose' may be effectively frustrated by 'the
simple expedient of not yielding'.
The decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon would seem effectively to
insulate questions concerning the legitimacy of federal grant-in-aid
programmes from judicial scrutiny, leaving such questions with Congress and the President where they had been for well over a century. In
large measure, that is precisely what has occurred. But, as though de
Tocqueville were not to be denied, the issue finally arose in a context
which, in the Court's view, was appropriate for judicial consideration.
Congress, in 1933, enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act to raise
the price of specified agricultural commodities by reducing the farm
surplus. The Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to contract
with farmers to reduce acreage or production in return for rental or
benefit payments. Funds for these payments were to be raised by a tax
upon processors of the particular commodity. In United States v.
Butler, 96 the receiver of a cotton processor from whom the United
States sought to collect the tax challenged the entire programme as
beyond the power of the federal government, squarely raising the
question of the extent of Congressional power under the 'general
welfare' clause. 97
The Court, noting that the issue had not previously been decided by
it, with little discussion and no analysis adopted the Hamiltonian
position. But what the Court gave with one hand, it quickly took away
with the other, for it held that the Act invaded 'the reserved rights of the
states', thereby violating the Tenth Amendment. The question whether
an appropriation in aid of agriculture was for the 'general welfare' was
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expressly pretermitted: the vice of the Act, in the Court's view, lay in
another direction. It was, the Court said, 'a statutory plan to regulate
and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers
delegated to the federal government'.
Butler is reminiscent of Hammer v. Dagenhart. Both sought to limit
federal power by looking through the form of legislation to its true
objective. And like Hammer v. Dagenhart, Butler was swept away in
the Court's volte-face following the 'Court-packing plan'. Although
the decision has never been expressly overruled, there is no doubt that,
except in so far as it provides judicial confirmation of the broad
construction of the 'general welfare' clause, it lacks continuing significance. As a restriction upon federal power, indeed, much of its
vitality was sapped within a year by Steward Machine Co. v. Davis98
and Helvering v. Davis, 99 which upheld provisions of the Social
Security Act establishing an unemployment insurance programme and
a programme of old-age insurance. Both decisions stressed that the
problems to which the legislation was addressed were national in
scope, that the states alone were not capable of dealing with them, and
that, Congress has broad discretion to define the 'general welfare'.
Steward Machine and Helvering v. Davis did suggest two limitations
on the spending power: first, that expenditures must be for the general
welfare and not merely for local benefit; and, second, that Congress
might lack authority to condition its expenditures upon compliance
with requirements that were unrelated to the purpose of the expenditures or to other legitimate national objectives. Justiciability doctrines
have tended to prevent challenges on the former ground. In the few
cases in which such challenges have occurred, the Supreme Court has
deferred to Congressional judgment. 100 Madison's prediction that the
acceptance of Hamilton's broad reading of the 'general welfare' clause
would have the effect of excluding the judicial authority 'from its
participation in guarding the boundaries between the general and the
State Governments .. .' has proved entirely accurate.
The Supreme Court has had no occasion to consider a challenge on
the latter ground. Despite the many and varying conditions imposed
by the Congress on conditional subventions, the range of legitimate
federal concerns-as defined by Congress's legislative authority-is
now so broad that it seems unlikely a successful challenge could be
made.
Congress's authority to appropriate funds for the general welfare
enables it to wield considerable influence upon the activities of state
and local governments. By the use of 'matching' grants, it can alter
state and local budgetary priorities, leading state and local
governments to spend their revenues for purposes quite different from
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those that they would choose on their own. In addition, Congress's
power to condition grants upon compliance with the requirements it
has established perrriits it to influence the internal affairs of state and
local governments. During the past forty years, Congress has used that
power frequently to promote the efficiency and fair administration of
the many state and local activities that are supported partly through
federal subventions. It has mandated organizational structures,
personnel policies, and procedures for state and local programmes
receiving federal funds. Not surprisingly, state and local governments
have often resented such requirements as unwarranted intrusions into
their internal affairs. By and large, the tensions that they generate have
been dealt with at a political level. The one attempt by a state to obtain
constitutional protection was unsuccessful. In Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Commission, 101 the state challenged the validity of a federal
statute that prohibited any state or local official 'whose principal
employment is in connection with any activity ... financed in whole or
in part by loans or grants made by the United States' from taking 'any
active part in political management or political campaign'. Federal
officials, acting pursuant to the legislation, ordered the state to
discharge a member of the state highway commission who had
violated the provision. The legislation provided that if the state failed
to comply with the order, an amount equal to twice the offending
official's annual compensation was to be withheld from grants due to
the state. In sustaining the statute, the Court stressed that the
requirement imposed by Congress served a national interest in
securing 'better public service' by those administering federal funds. It
also emphasized that the case did not require a determination whether
the federal government could force the official to be removed. The
state might, as it had, retain the official and merely suffer the reduction
of the grant.
On the facts before the Court, the penalty stipulated by the legislation was sufficiently small for incurring it to be a realistic alternative
for the state. In general, however, the threat of withholding funds gives
the federal government sufficient leverage for the states to be effectively required to comply with the conditions it imposes.
V.

The Tenth Amendment as a Protection of State Autonomy

In a recent decision, National League of Cities v. Usery, 102 the Court
held that the Tenth Amendment offers the states some protection
against federal regulation of their internal affairs. The decision breaks
with a substantial body of precedent and, as a consequence, the
contours of the immunity it establishes are still highly uncertain. One

Ch.II Sanda/ow V

85

may find in the opinion the seeds of constitutional protection for a
broad area of state and local autonomy. Conversely, Usery may be no
more than an aberration, destined to be confined to its facts and
perhaps ultimately overruled as inconsistent with the course of constitutional development. An effort to assess the likelihood of these
possibilities, or of the further possibility that the Court will be able to
fashion a stable intermediate position, would unduly lengthen this
study and would, in any event, be highly speculative. Accordingly, in
the following paragraphs I shall attempt only to put the decision in
some perspective and to suggest some of the issues that it raises.
The Constitution does not in terms immunize either state or federal
governments from taxation or regulation by the other. The notion
that such immunities are none the less implicit in the Constitution
originates with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland. In holding that the federal government was immune from
taxation by the states, Marshall intimated that the states might not
enjoy a reciprocal immunity from federal taxation, 103 but since the
latter question was not before him, he left it undecided. Subsequent
decisions held that the states did have such an immunity and extended
it very broadly to include, for example, the income of state employees
and interest on state indebtedness. In the late 1930s, however, the
Court receded from its earlier positions, holding that income derived
from the states could be taxed by the federal government. Subsequent
decisions permitted the federal government to levy a tax upon at least
some state activities. These decisions left unclear the limits of federal
power to tax state activities, or even whether there were such limits.
Each of the cases decided by the Court involved taxes upon state
commercial activities. Some members of the Court thought such taxes
valid as long as they did not discriminate against the state, i.e. as long
as they were also imposed on private entities engaged in the activity.
Others maintained that Congress could impose a tax directly upon the
states as long as the activities taxed were not uniquely governmental. 104 But since Congress has not levied any taxes that transgress
either principle, the limits of its power have remained uncertain. 105
With but a few exceptions, 106 the question whether Congress, acting
under the commerce power and other enumerated powers, could
regulate state activities did not reach the Court until it had receded
from its extreme position on state tax immunities. Since the 1930s,
until Usery, the Court has consistently upheld such regulations without regard to whether the activities were 'uniquely governmental' . 107
In Maryland v. Wirtz, for example, the Court sustained an amendment
to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended wage and hour regulations to certain state employees. Once it was established that the
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regulated activities affected interstate commerce, the Court said, it was
'not tenable' to argue that Congress's control over interstate commerce 'must yield to state sovereignty in the performance of governmental functions'. In exercising its powers, the federal government
'may override countervailing state interests whether these be described
as "governmental" or "proprietary in character'".
Following the decision in Wirtz, Congress again amended the Fair
Labor Standards Act, this time extending its coverage to nearly all state
and local employees. In Usery, a closely divided Court overruled Wirtz
and held the amendment unconstitutional as an intrusion upon state
sovereignty. Conceding that the amendment came within the commerce power, the Court concluded that it none the less violated a
constitutional policy, embodied in the Tenth Amendment, that 'Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system'. 108
To subject state and local governments to federal wage and hour
regulations would
interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bodies .... [Their
application will] significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure
employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation .... [I]t is
functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services
such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If
Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of
these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States'
'separate and independent existence' . 109

Accordingly, the Court concluded, '[t]his exercise of Congressional
authority does not comport with the federal system of government
embodied in the Constitution'.
The Court's decision raises more questions than it answers. Prior to
Usery, it had been conventional learning that, as stated in United
States v. Darby, the Tenth 'Amendment states nothing but a truism
that all is retained [by the states] which has not been surrendered'. In
holding that the amendment is now to be given substantive meaning,
the Court thus sets sail in uncharted waters. All that can be done here is
to identify some of the questions that the Court will be required to
consider.
A. DOES THE TENTH AMENDMENT LIMIT CONGRESS'S
POWER TO REGULATE PRIVATE CONDUCT?

In Usery, the Court was careful to confine its decision to the regulation
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of state activities. 'It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress
to enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the
dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in
which they reside. It is quite anothq to uphold a similar exercise of
congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the
States as States.' 110 But, as Professor Laurence Tribe has argued, if the
decision signals an attempt to protect 'those functions most essential to
the continued significance of the states as governmental entities ... it is
difficult to justify the Court's willingness to protect the state in its role
as an employer and provider of services and not in its role as lawmaker
and regulator of private conduct'. 111 It remains to be seen whether the
Court can maintain so tenuous a line.
B. WHICH STATE ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONSIDERED
'INTEGRAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS'?

The Court was careful to preserve the authority of a number of its prior
decisions upholding federal regulation of state activities that it now
characterized as not 'integral' to the states' governmental functions. It
remains unclear, however, how it is to be determined which state
activities do involve 'integral' governmental functions. For example, is
the test one of tradition, that the states have 'always' performed the
activity; or does the characterization of the states' activity depend
upon whether it is also commonly undertaken by private enterprise; or
does it depend upon the Court's assessment of the importance of the
activity?
C. WHICH OF CONGRESS'S POWERS ARE LIMITED BY THE
TENTH AMENDMENT?

The Court explicitly reserved the question whether the states' Tenth
Amendment autonomy limited Congressional authority under either
the Fourteenth Amendment or the spending power. With respect to the
former, it might be argued that the states can enjoy no immunity from
Congressional action under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was
adopted later than the Tenth, but such a formalistic approach to so
large a question would not appear very satisfactory. Even this avenue
is unavailable, however, with respect to the spending power, and it
i,s pursuant to that power, as discussed above, that the Congress has
gone farthest in interfering with the traditional incidents of state
sovereignty. An attempt by the Court, at this time, to curb Congress's
exercise of such power would have a marked effect on state-federal
relations. 112
As these questions suggest, the full meaning of Usery is not likely to
be known for many years. Until they are answered, however, the
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decision is bound to exercise an unsettling effect upon state-federal
relationships.
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